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IPO Underpricing, Firm Quality, and 
Subsequent Reissuance Activity
Karen C. Denning 
Stephen P. Ferris 
Glenn Wolfe
A signaling argument has recently been developed whereby IPO 
underpricing is a signal of future firm value. Only higher quality firms 
can be expected to recover the cost of this signal through subsequent 
offerings of seasoned equities. This study uses three proxies for firm 
quality and finds evidence of a positive relationship between these 
measures of firm quality and reissuance activity. Greater IPO 
underpricing is also found to be associated with greater levels of future 
equity selling and higher levels of earnings per share.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the phenomenon of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing is 
extensively examined in the literature (see [28], [25], [26], [30], [20]) no 
consensual explanation for underpricing has evolved.* Recently however, 
work by Welch [31] and Allen and Faulhaber [2] suggests a signaling model 
of IPO underpricing that is driven by the reissuance behavior of these 
companies. That is, underpricing at the time of initial issue is a loss that 
only “good” or high-quality firms can exp>ect to recoup. Consequently, it 
is costly for poorer-quality firms to imitate this underpricing. This line of 
reasoning suggests that underpricing can be used to signal future earning 
prospects. Hence, higher-quality firms may be able to recover the loss 
associated with an IPO underpricing through future offerings of equity. This 
reissuance argument of Welch and Allen and Faulhaber is in general 
agreement with Ibbotson’s [15] observation that IPOs are underpriced in 
order to “leave a good taste in investors’ mouths that future underwritings
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from the same issuer could be sold at attractive prices. This argument 
is also consistent with the empirical observation that IPO investors, on 
average, earn a positive abnormal return whereas investors in secondary 
offerings, on average, earn a negative abnormal return, (see Smith, [29]). 
Hence, it seems reasonable that “good,” high quality firms can underprice 
expecting to recoup any losses when future projects require a secondary 
offering of equity.
This study analyzes the reissuance explanation for IPO underpricing 
through an examination of the relationship between firm quality and the 
subsequent offering of seasoned equity issues. Since the reissuance argument 
contends that IPO underpricing is a signal used by higher-quality firms 
whose cost is recovered in future selling activities, we should expect to observe 
a positive relation between measures of firm quality and reissuance activity. 
Additionally, IPO underpricing and the level of equity reissuance should 
be positively related as firms attempt to recoup any underpricing losses they 
incur upon going public.
In the following section we discuss our data and sample construction 
procedures as well as the selection process for measures of firm quality. Section 
III contains further comments on our methodology and discusses the empirical 
findings. We conclude with a review and summary in section IV.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION
A. Sample Construction
In order to construct our sample, we consider all IPOs listed on the 
Registered Offerings Statistics (ROS) Tape compiled by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.^ Due to our desire to examine subsequent reissuance 
activity, we terminate our sample in 1985. This allows us to follow the 
reissuance behavior of the most recent IPOs for three years, since the ROS 
tape available to us is current only through 1988. Consistent with other 
researchers in this area, (e.g. [4], [23], [32]) IPOs registered under Regulation 
A (common stock offerings below 11,500,000) are not included in the sample. 
Likewise, unit offerings are also excluded. IPOs underwritten on a best efforts 
basis are not included in our study, since work by Ritter [27] and Chalk and 
Peavey [9] notes peculiarities in the initial performance of best efforts as 
compared to firm commitment offerings. Thus our final sample consists of 
1,582 IPOs, spanning the years 1973-1985.
IPOs are typically traded on the OTC (Over-the-Counter) market. 
Consequently, we use the CRSP NASDAQ (National Association of Security 
Dealers Automatic Quotation) tape to obtain our time series of returns as well 
as the number of shares outstanding following the IPO.® Data concerning the
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specifics of the registration for our sample is obtained from the ROS tape. Data 
obtained from this tape include the issuer, security type, offering date, offering 
price, number of shares offered to the public, size of the secondary distribution 
and die amount of debt outstanding prior to die IPO / Earnings information 
on all of the IPO sample firms is obtained from COMPUSTAT.
B. Measure of Ex-Ante Firm Quality
Given that the reissuance argument for IPO underpricing is a signaling- 
based theory regarding the firm’s prospects, the measurement of ex-ante firm 
quality is extremely critical. Unfortunately, however, there is no single 
agreed-upon definition or measure of firm quality. Nevertheless, the 
literature does suggest several alternatives. Leland and Pyle [21] contend that 
the degree of founder retention is a possible signal of firm quality. If the 
founders elect to retain a significant percentage ownjership in the firm, this 
indicates favorable expectations concerning future firm earnings and growth. 
The firm’s owners should possess the most complete information set 
available about the firm and presumably will adjust their holdings 
accordingly. Owner retention as a signal of firm value, however, has received 
only mixed support in the empirical literature. (See [10], [20].) Nevertheless, 
we will use the level of owner retention at the time of the IPO as one of 
the study’s measures of ex-ante firm quality. Using share structure data 
available on the CRSP NASDAQ Tape and the ROS Tape, we calculate the 
percentage of owner retention, a as follows;
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a =
Shares Outstanding ^ / Primary Shares l Secondary \
After IPO
....... ..... '
Offered Shares Offered
Shares Outstanding i / Primary Shares \
After IPO Offered\ /
Appendix A contains a derivation of this measure for owner retention.
The agency literature (see [11], [24], [3]) develops a certification 
argument whereby firms that enter credit markets have their future earnings 
prospects implicitly certified by the lender’s decision to extend credit. Harris 
and Raviv [13] examine the role of debt in the firm’s capital structure and 
the consequent ability of investors to oversee managerial decisions. Debt is 
potentially a disciplining device, reducing the free cash flow available to 
management and, as Jensen [17] notes, restricting managerial discretion. 
Further, the mere ability of the organization to meet its contractual payments 
provides information about the quality or earning capability of the firm. 
Campbell and Kracaw [7] and Fama [12] suggest that borrowing reduces the 
information costs for all the firm’s claimants. Thus, according to this
viewpoint, the existence of debt serves as one indicator of favorable future 
cash flows.* Allen and Faulhaber also suggest debt as a possible signal of 
IPO quality in their development of an underpricing equilibrium. Evidence 
from Megginson and Weiss [22] is consistent with this argument and 
indicates that venture capitalist backing of an IPO serves a certification 
function, reducing IPO underpricing and maximizing the IPO proceeds. 
Finally, James and Weir [16] provide evidence that firms with borrowing 
histories are underpriced substantially less than other initial offerings. 
Consequently, we use the amount of total long-term debt calculated from 
the last balance sheet prior to the IPO as another measure of firm quality.®
A number of studies (e.g. [4], [18], [8]) examine the relationship between 
IPO underpricing and the prestige of the lead investment banker. Using 
various methodologies, the authors separate investment bankers into various 
groups based upon their prestige or reputation.*” The critical finding 
obtained from these studies is that more prestigious underwriters are 
generally associated with lower risk issues. Viewing low risk issues as higher 
quality firms, leads us to select the prestige or non-prestige of the leading 
IPO underwriter as our third and last measure of firm quality. Specifically, 
we adopt the classification scheme for underwriter prestige originally 
suggested by Hayes [ 14]. We define a prestigious underwriter as either a bulge 
bracket or major bracket banker." Using this definition, approximately 10 
percent of the underwriters are classified as prestigious.
It could be argued that low risk and high return are more direct measures 
of firm quality than those we have selected.'^ However, prior to their initial 
public offering, sample firms may not provide reliable or quantifiable data 
on these measures. Each of our quality proxies, debt, owner-retention, and 
underwriter prestige may correlate highly with firm quality. However, it may 
be that they are indirect measures of quality. The research of Megginson and 
Weiss [22] and Barry et al. [3] suggests that there are many potential measures 
of firm quality. Enumerating them all and defining the best quality proxy 
is beyond the scope of our paper. Essentially we suggest that high quality 
firms are those with low risk, high return, and favorable future earnings 
prospects. We attempt to proxy these “high quality” variables with a high 
degree of founder retention, increased use of long term debt, and the 
employment of more prestigious underwriters.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Overview of Reissuance Activity
In Table 1, we present an overall analysis of IPO reissuance activity for 
IPOs falling within the period of 1977-1985. Of the 1,582 IPOs in our sample.
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Table 1
The Reissuance Behavior of IPOs
Issue 
Subsequent 
to IPO
Number 
of Issuing 
Firms
Mean Number 
of Days 
Since IPO
Mean Number 
of Days Since 
Last Issue
Cumulative Value of 
Seasoned Issue Relative 
to IPO Value
First 251 445 445 1.89
Second 54 732 287 5.50
Third 10 846 113 12.60
only 20 percent (315 firms) do in fact, reissue equity.*'*’’^  Although this may 
be a low percentage, it may be that our selection of the study period eliminates 
some firms which do, in fact, subsequently reissue. Alternatively, it may be 
that firms expect to reissue, but that ex-post performance and financing needs 
do not warrant it. Or it may be that firms are able to correctly anticipate their 
future needs at the time of the initial offering and thus have no need to quickly 
return to the capital market. There is some evidence from our sample to support 
such a contention. On average those firms which did not reissue had larger 
IPOs as measured by the dollar registration value than those that did 
subsequently reissue. For instance, non-reissuers had average IPOs 3% larger 
than single reissuers while exceeding the IPO size of multiple re-issuers by 
nearly 10.5%. In addition to the relatively small number of reissuers, Table 1 
also provides data on two other important features of reissuance activity. First, 
there is a noticeable tendency for reissuances to be, on average, much larger 
in size than the IPO. Each reissuance, in fact, tends to increase in magnitude 
relative to the IPO, so that the third reissuance is nearly seven times as large 
as the initial offering. This result is hardly surprising if reissuing firms are 
attempting to recoup their losses from the IPO. It is further consistent with 
higher quality firms or those with favorable growth and earnings prospects, 
reissuing to finance those opportunities. Secondly, we also observe in Table
1 a pattern of a decreasing intermission between reissues. The mean elapsed 
time between the second and third reissuance is about one-fourth that between 
the IPO and the first reissuance. Thus reissuing firms not only increase the 
mean size of their seasoned offerings, but also shorten the time between 
reissuances. Such findings are consistent with firms accelerating their schedule 
of reissuances in order to recapture their IPO losses. However, care should be 
taken not to over interpret the strength of this result. Presumably firms reissue 
because they need the financing. The present-value of an IPO underpricing 
loss, if recouped more than a year subsequent to the IPO, would hardly in 
itself justify incurring the initial IPO loss. It seems more reasonable to suggest 
that high quality firms, with favorable earnings projects and prospects need 
increasingly more financing to fund these projects.
B. Reissuance and Firm Quality
If IPO underpricing is a loss that only high quality firms can expect 
to recover at the time of subsequent seasoned offerings, then we should expect 
to observe a positive relationship betvv?een reissuance activity and measures 
of firm quality. In this section, we examine reissuance and various measures 
of firm quality.
In Table 2, the level of owner retention at the time of the IPO is divided 
into deciles. We examine mean issue size of subsequent proceeds as it relates 
to the IPO. Examining the first reissuance, (see column 2) the results indicate 
that reissuance size increases as the degree of owner retention increases. This 
finding holds across all the seasoned offerings (see columns 3 through 5) and 
is especially strong for the total reissuance figures. The highest decile of 
owner retention is associated with a mean value of total seasoned offerings 
that is three times as great as that of the lowest decile of owner retention. 
Panel B of Table 2 examines the statistical significance of the difference 
between the top and bottom deciles of our sample. As can be seen, the 
difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These results are 
consistent with higher quality firms, as measured by the degree of founder 
retention, engaging in greater total reissuance activity than correspondingly 
lower quality firms.
Using the categorization of underwriter prestige described earlier in 
section II, we examine the reissuance behavior of IPOs. The results are 
presented in Table 3. In all cases, IPOs that were originally underwritten 
by a prestigious investment banking house returned to the market in larger 
volume than did those underwritten by non-prestigious investment bankers. 
The differences in mean issue size are significant at various standard levels 
of significance as indicated in panel B.
Results for the use of debt are consistent with our findings for the other 
measures of firm quality and also consistent with the results of James and 
Weir [16]. That is, there is a significant difference in reissuance activity 
between those IPOs with the highest debt levels prior to the IPO and those 
with the lowest (see Table 4). Firms with the highest degrees of financial 
leverage prior to going public follow the behavior of high quality companies 
and do in fact issue substantially more seasoned equity than less levered firms. 
Upon comparing the difference between total seasoned offering size for the 
first and last debt level deciles, we find it is significant at the one percent 
level.
Overall, the findings regarding our measures of firm quality and the 
volume of subsequent seasoned offerings support the contention that IPO 
underpricing signals the favorableness of future firm cash flows. A more 
direct test for our purpose is an examination of IPO underpricing and
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Table 2
Mean Issue Size Relative to the IPO
Total
Level of Owner First Seasoned Second Seasoned Third Seasoned Seasoned 
Retention (Decile) Offering Offering Offering Offerings
A. Reissuance Behavior and Firm Quality: Owner Retention Levels
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1 1.03 2.33 10.60 1.66
2 1.53 2.61 — 2.22
3 1.14 2.40 2.66 1.59
4 1.69 2.80 — 2.60
5 1.64 4.54 2.67 2.98
6 1.84 — 6.40 1.84
7 2.15 3.37 — 2.37
8 1.90 2.37 — 2.45
9 2.55 1.39 10.56 2.69
10 2.34 7.50 11.26 5.06
B. Mean Differences In Reissuance Activity Between Top and Bottom Deciles
First Seasoned Second Seasoned Third Seasone Total
Offering Offering Offering Seasoned Offerings
1.31 5.17 0.66 3.40
(2.10)* (2.89)* (1.43) (2.78)**
Note: Decile 1 represents the lowest degree of owner retention at the time of the IPO while decile 10 
represents the highest.
* indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level 
indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
Table 3
Mean Issue Size Relative to the IPO
Total
Underwriter First Seasoned Second Seasoned Third Seasoned Seasoned
Prestige Offering Offering Offering Offerings
A. Reissuance Behavior and Firm Quality: Underwriter Prestige
Prestigious 2.33 4.55 10.60 3.90
Non-Prestigious 1.66 3.15 4.54 2.47
B. Mean Differences In Reissuance Activity Between Prestigious and 
Non-prestigious Underwritten IPOs
First Seasoned Second Seasoned Third Seasone Total
Offering Offering Offering Seasoned Offerings
0.67 1.40 6.06 1.43
(1.70)* (2.13)** (2.83)*** (2.27)**
Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
reissuance activity. The greater the underpricing, the more costly the signal 
is to the firm. Thus, the more likely it should be that the firm will reissue 
in order to recover this cost. Our results for the underpricing deciles are 
presented in Table As in the previous tables, column 2 indicates the 
mean issue size of the first offering relative to the IPO proceeds. There is 
a marked tendency for firms with greater underpricing at the time of initial 
issue to return to the equity market in greater volume. This tendency remains 
consistent across all seasoned offerings (see columns 3 and 5). Column 5 
indicates that those firms with the highest level of IPO underpricing re-issue 
nearly 2.5 times the volume of those with the least underpricing. This 
difference is significant at the one percent level. These results are consistent 
with an attempt by higher quality firms to offset their loss upon going public 
through the repeated sale of appreciated stock. Again, we do not suggest that 
seasoned offerings occur for the purpose of recovering IPO costs. Seasoned 
offerings presumably occur because the firm needs capital. However, higher 
quality firms can underprice at the initial offering, apparently knowing that 
subsequent seasoned offerings of appreciated equity will enable them to 
recover some of these losses.
However, there is a phenomenon which may help to explain why only 
20% of the sample firms reissue. That phenomenon is the rationing of IPO 
shares. Full or overpricing of the seasoned offering to recoup the losses which 
result from IPO underpricing, suggests that there may be a wealth transfer from 
those investors buying the seasoned issues to those buying the initial offering. 
If the investors (initial and seasoned) are the same individuals or group, 
deferring the higher price of the seasoned equity sale would be economically 
rational. The rational investor would rather purchase an underpriced issue and 
then defer to the future the cost of overpriced seasoned equity offerings. This 
argument is consistent with the empirical findings of negative abnormal 
returns to secondary offerings as reported by Smith [29].
However, when those investors who are able to subscribe to the initial 
offering are different from those who purchase the secondary, the purchasers 
at the time of the secondary may be subsidizing the IPO investors if firms are 
underpricing the IPO with the intent to recoup any losses with future offerings. 
Since many new issues are oversubscribed, firms may be reluctant to favor one 
group at the expense of a second. Over subscription is consistent with Rock’s 
[28] model of underpricing and it is further supported by the empirical results 
of Koh and Walter [19] and Benveniste and Spindt [5].’* Firms may therefore 
plan their eventual financing needs well into the future and attempt to satisfy 
these needs at the time of the initial offering so as not to appear to favor one 
investor group over another. This line of reasoning suggests that only some 
high quality firms will recoup their losses whereas some high quality firms 
may simply be willing to bear the underpricing cost of the IPO.
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Table 4
Mean Issue Size Relative to the IPO
Level of 
Long Term 
Debt (Decile)
First Seasoned Second Seasoned Third Seasoned 
Offering Offering Offering
Total
Seasoned
Offerings
A. Reissuance Behavior and Firm Quality: Use of Long Term Debt
1 1.42 2.29 — 2.85
2 1.67 2.04 2.60 2.77
3 2.08 2.57 ------ 2.14
4 1.72 2.95 2.99 2.31
5 1.66 1.99 2.66 1.99
6 1.67 2.42 3.50 2.64
7 1.88 3.45 — 2.58
8 1.52 3.44 — 2.19
9 1.56 2.79 1.64 2.70
10 2.35 3.30 4.17 4.46
B. Mean Differences In Reissuance Activity Between Top and Bottom Deciles
First Seasoned Second Seasoned Third Seasone Total
Offering Offering Offering Seasoned Offerings
0.93 1.01 ------ 1.61
(1.24) (2.23)* (2.79)**
Note: Decile 1 represents the lowest degree of long-term debt usage immediately prior to the IPO while 
decile 10 represents the highest.
* indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
To further examine the relationship between IPO underpricing and 
reissuance activity we estimate the following cross-sectional regression:
Rj =  Bo +  Bi SOj,i +  B2S0;,2 +  €j
where: Rj =  underpricing of firm j  at the time of the IPO 
and SO/,, =  market value for firm j of seasoned offering i relative to the 
initial public offering.
We obtain the following parameter estimates with t statistics provided in 
parentheses. Note that the coefficients associated with the first two seasoned 
offerings are significant at the 5 percent level. We estimate only the 
coefficients of the first two seasoned offerings because third and subsequent 
offerings are relatively rare and hence there are insufficient observations for 
meaningful estimation.
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Table 5
M ean Issue Size Relative to the IPO
Level of Owner First Seasoned 
Retention (Decile) Offering
Second Seasoned Third Seasoned 
Offering Offering
Total
Seasoned
Offerings
A. Reissuance Behavior and IPO Underpricing
1 1.35 1.37 1.77 1.64
2 1.88 2.56 2.34 2.32
3 1.18 2.68 2.01 3.81
4 1.67 1.73 — 1.96
5 2.29 2.44 — 2.76
6 2.15 2.98 2.71 2.55
7 1.59 4.06 — 2.14
8 1.60 2.47 — 2.14
9 2.69 3.91 - 4.30 3.24
10 2.31 5.00 4.58 3.93
B. Mean Differences In Reissuance Activity Between Top and Bottom Deciles
First Seasoned Second Seasoned T/iird Seasone Total
Offering Offering Offering Seasoned Offerings
0.96 3.63 2.81 2.29
(1.73)* (2.88)*** (2.79)*** (3.02)***
Note: Decile 1 represents the lowest degree of owner retention at the time of the IPO while decile 10 
represents the highest.
* indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
Ri =  0.518 +  0.275 SOj.i +  0.089 SO/,2 
(0.951) (2.124)** (2.540)**
This positive relationship between IPO underpricing and subsequent 
reissuance is consistent with the cost recapture argument. Greater 
underpricing does seem to be associated with substantial reissuance activity.
An additional test of the signaling quality of IPO underpricing is the 
examination of underpricing and subsequent earnings performance. Higher 
quality firms should exhibit a superior earnings capability in addition to 
their hypothesized greater underpricing. Consequently we examine the 
following regression:
Rj =  Bo +  BiEPSj.1 +  B2EPSj.2 +B3£PS/3 +  ej
Again, where: Rj =  underpricing of firm j at the time of the IPO and
EPS;,, =  earnings per share for firm j in year i relative to the IPO.
The following parameter estimates are obtained, again with t statistics 
provided in the parentheses:
Ri =  0.418 +  0.843 EPSi +  0.747 EPS2 +  0.029 EPS3 
(1.123) (1.731)* (1.521) (1.043)
The coefficient of EPSi is significant at the 10% level while that for EPSi 
is significant only at the 13% level. Although not statistically strong results, 
these findings are in the hypothesized direction and do suggest evidence of 
a relationship between the level of IPO underpricing and firm quality as 
measured by the magnitude of subsequent earnings per share. Such a 
relationship is. consistent with higher quality firms using underpricing as 
a signaling mechanism to the marketplace.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This study empirically examines the signaling nature of IPO underpricing. 
Since underpricing is a costly signal, it can be most effectively used by high 
quality firms. Only high quality firms can recoup an underpricing loss by 
engaging in successful reissuance of equity. Using three different measures 
of ex-ante firm quality, our findings suggest that higher quality firms do, 
in fact, reissue in greater volume than lower quality firms. There is also 
evidence of a strong positive relationship between IPO underpricing and 
subsequent reissuance activity. Further, higher levels of underpricing at the 
time of the initial offering appear to be weakly associated with subsequently 
greater earnings per share. Overall, our findings suggest that underpricing 
may be used by better quality firms to signal their prospects to capital market 
participants. These findings are in agreement with much of the previous 
research concerning underpricing and firm quality and are further consistent 
with the models developed by Welch [31] and Allen and Faulhaber [2]. 
Whatever underpricing losses are suffered may be recovered through the 
significantly higher priced reissuances of seasoned equity. Yet not all firms 
promptly reissue. Hence these results, like those of previous researchers, fail 
to suggest a complete explanation for the underpricing of initial public 
offerings. A fuller explanation of the IPO phenomenon is likely to be multi­
faceted, including considerations of information asymmetry, due diligence, 
insurance, and underwriter reputational capital. Yet these findings do 
suggest that a partial explanation as to why firms appear willing to
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underprice, and “leave money on the table” at the initial offering is that they 
can recover these losses through seasoned offerings.
APPENDIX A 
ESTIMATION OF THE OWNERS’ RETENTION RATIO
We estimate the owners’ retention ratio, a  as the percentage of the firm’s 
original capitalization that the founders elect to keep. It can be expressed as:
_  number of shares retained by founding shareholders 
“ ~  number of shares originally issued by firm (1)
Although we do not have these specific variables available on the CRSP 
NASDAQ and ROS tapes, we can estimate equation (1) from the share 
structure data that is provided. Consider the following variables which are 
available from the ROS and COMPUSTAT tapes:
(1) PRIMARY =  new shares offered to the public during the IPO 
(2) SECOND =  shares offered to the public through the sale of old 
shares by the firm's founders during the IPO 
(3) OUTSTAND =  total number of firm’s shares outstanding after the IPO.
One can proceed to estimate the number of shares retained by the firm’s 
founders after the IPO by defining the variable OLD as the number of shares 
originally owned by the founders. Thus,
OUTSTAND =  (OLD -  SECOND) +  PRIMARY +  SECOND (2)
Equation (2) shows that the total number of shares outstanding is the sura 
of the shares retained by the founders (OLD-SECOND), the secondary 
distribution and the primary shares. Thus, we can calculate the number of 
shares retained by the founding shareholders, RETAIN, by the following
RETAIN =  OUTSTAND -  SECOND -  PRIMARY
=  [(OLD -  SECOND) +  SECOND +  PRIMARY] -  SECOND 
-  PRIMARY
=  OLD -  SECOND (3)
Equation (3) thus provides an estimate of the shares retained by the original 
owners. The original capitalization of the firm, ORIGINAL can be 
estimated as:
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ORIGINAL =  OUTSTAND -  PRIMARY
=  [(OLD ”  SECOND) +  SECOND +  PRIMARY] -  
PRIMARY
=  OLD (4)
We can therefore rewrite equation (1) as equation (3) divided by equation (4):
^ ^  OUTSTAND -  SECOND -  PRIMARY 
OUTSTAND -  PRIMARY
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NOTES
1. This may be because a complete explanation of IPO underpricing will require the 
consideration of numerous factors such as informational asymmetries, underwriter due 
diligence efforts, issuer risk characteristics and reputational capital issues.
2. Aggarwal and Rivoli [1] suggest an alternative hypothesis with respect to new issuance 
that may deserve closer scrutiny. It may be that IPO’s are not initially underpriced, but 
rather that subsequent to the issuance of a new security, the after market overvalues the 
security. We do not distinguish between over valuation in the immediate after market 
and under valuation at the initial offering. Which explanation is more accurate is not 
of central concern to this manuscript. The purpose of our paper is an attempt at 
explaining the relationship between initial performance, measures of firm quality, and 
subsequent reissuance activity.
3. It should also be recognized that as companies mature, they tend to become less risky 
as more information about their performance is available to investors. This allows these 
firms to become established in their respective industries and thus require less 
underpricing to place subsequent issues of their common stock.
4. The cost of going public consists of two components. The first is the direct cost which 
include underwriter commissions, legal fees and various advertising/administrative 
expenses. Ritter [27] estimates these at $250,000, plus 7% of gross proceeds. The indirect 
cost, which serves as the focus of this study is the underpricing. Ritter estimates the 
average underpricing for a new issue at nearly 15%.
5. Because there is some concern about the reliability of data from the ROS tape, when 
possible we verified the data with secondary sources such as Investment Dealers Digest, 
The Wall Street Journal, and SirP Corporate News.
6. We verified the shares outstanding date with data available from COMPUSTAT.
7. Studies by Ritter [25] and Barry et al. [3] find industry and timing patterns in the market 
for IPOs. The proliferation of new issues in the natural resources industries in the early 
1980s is a noteworthy example. The sample used in this study however does not demonstrate 
any obvious year-to-year pattern in either the timing or industry distribution of IPOs. The 
annual frequency of IPOs ranges from a minimum of 10 in 1977 to a maximum of 359 
is 1983. There is a skewness in the overall frequency of IPOs however widi 74% of the 
IPOs occuring in the latter half of our sample period. The IPOs are broadly distributed 
across SIC codes, with all two digit groups represented. The greatest concentration [34%] 
is in the 30 group, a subset of manufacturing. The least concentrated SIC two digit grouping 
in our sample is 10, mining, which contains only 4.5% of our observations.
8. Debt may also serve as a variable which differentiates those firms v^ith assets in place 
from those whose principal assets are future growth options.
9. We also use total long-term debt standardized by the value of the IPO and obtain 
essentially the same results as reported in Table 3. Thus we do not report these results 
separately. See Harris and Raviv [13].
10. Carter and Manaster [8] develop a continuous ranking scheme for underwriter prestige, 
but is fails to noticeably outperform a simple binary classification. Consequently, we 
elect to simply dichomotize our sample of investment bankers into prestigious and non- 
prestigious classifications. See Benveniste and Wilhelm [6] for other potential 
calssification schemes.
11. We also use two alternative definitions of underwriter prestige: bulge bracket alone and 
bulge, major, and sub-major brackets combined. The results are not significandy 
different from those obtained with the bulge-major bracket classification and hence are 
not reported.
12. James and Weir [16] suggest that debt may serve as a signal of risk. High risk firms 
may choose not to issue debt prior to the initial offering of equity due to the high 
dispersion of the firm’s future value.
13. In Barry et al. [3], underwriter warrants are a potential quality measure. Warrants are 
a form of underwriter compensation which increase in value as the stock is more 
underpriced. Hence, given informational asymmetry between issuers and investors, the 
use of warrants reduces the probability or extent the issue is overpriced by providing 
the underwriter an incentive to set a lower initial offering price. Megginson and Weiss
[22] examine venture capitalist backing of IPOs.
14. This percentage is consistent with the empirical evidence presented by Welch [31]. Of 
his sample of 1,028 IPOs, 28% representing 288 firms reissued with offerings of seasoned 
equity.
15. Of the 1,267 non-reissuers in our sample, 356 ceased trading before the end of our study 
period. If we consider only those IPOs which survived over the entire period of our 
analysis, then the percent of reissuers increases to 26%.
16. Our methods of estimating IPO underpricing follows that of Beatty and Ritter [4] and 
Ritter [27]. Underpricing is defined as: (BP-OP)/OP, where OP is the offering price and 
BP is the closing bid price on the first day of public trading.
17. Based upon data supplied by the Investment Dealer’s Digest Corporation of New York, 
we examined more recent levels of IPO underpricing for years not contained in the 
sample. Using total registration of the issue as our measure of firm size, we classified 
IPOs for the years 1989 and 1990 into quartiles. The average underpricing for the smallest 
quartile over these two years was 11.65% while that for the largest quartile was 3.07%. 
The difference in mean underpricing across these quartiles was statistically significant 
at the 1% level using both the student t and Wilcoxon Z statistics.
18. See also Benveniste and Wilhelm [6].
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